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HOLLINGSWORTH V. PERRY
STANDING OVER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Caitlin E. Borgmann*
INTRODUCTION
One might expect that a Supreme Court decision addressing the
constitutionality of a citizen initiative that bars marriage between same-sex
couples would yield a predictable political division among both the Justices
and Court commentators. Liberal Justices and commentators, one might
conjecture, would want the Court to recognize a fundamental constitutional
right to marriage equality, while conservative Justices and commentators
would prefer the issue be left to the political process. The Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Hollingsworth v. Perry reflected no such tidy outcome,
however. The majority opinion addressing California’s Proposition 8 (“Prop
8”), which amended the state’s constitution to exclude same-sex couples
from legally recognized marriage, sidestepped the substantive issue through
a procedural maneuver. Rather than reach the merits, the Court held that the
official proponents of Prop 8, who had defended its constitutionality both in
the district court and on appeal, lacked standing to appeal the district court’s
opinion invalidating the initiative. The Court’s decision left marriage
equality as the rule in California (although not elsewhere). Liberal Justices
Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan joined Chief Justice Roberts’s majority
opinion, as did Justice Scalia, while conservative Justices Thomas and
Alito, and liberal Justice Sotomayor, joined Justice Kennedy’s vigorous
dissent. Some liberal commentators who favor marriage equality applauded
the Court’s decision.1
*

Professor of Law, CUNY School of Law. Thanks to the CUNY Law Review for
inviting me to contribute this case comment.
1
See, e.g., Suzanne Goldberg, A One-Two Punch to the Nation’s Most Prominent Antigay Laws, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2013), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/a-one-
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It is of course not possible to know exactly what motivated each of the
Justices in Hollingsworth. But standing is a doctrine that the Court has
notoriously manipulated to reach desired results on the merits.2
Commentators have widely speculated that the liberal Justices who sided
with the majority preferred not to reach the merits either because they
believed there were insufficient votes to find Prop 8 unconstitutional,3 or
because they believed such a decision might be politically premature and
therefore counterproductive, as it might prompt a backlash.4 Some
proponents of marriage equality were quietly relieved by the Court’s refusal
to address the merits, since it allowed the district court’s invalidation of
Prop 8 to stand without risking an adverse Supreme Court decision that
would be binding on all states.5
Regardless of the Justices’ motivations, it is important to remember that,
historically, limitations on standing have reflected a conservative impulse to
close the doors of the federal courts to rights claimants and to expand the
power of the political branches, especially the Executive branch.6 Justice
two-punch-to-the-nations-most-prominent-antigay-laws/; Nan Hunter, Commentary on
Marriage Decisions by Matt Coles, HUNTER OF JUSTICE (June 26, 2013),
http://hunterofjustice.com/2013/06/commentary-on-marriage-decisions-by-matt-coles.html
(commentary by Matt Coles, Deputy Legal Director of the ACLU, asserting, “The majority
opinion in Perry is not an indefensible duck of the marriage issue.”).
2
See Girardeau A. Spann, Color-Coded Standing, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1422, 1452
(1995) (“Doctrinal inconsistencies in the Supreme Court’s law of standing are now so
commonplace that they have become relatively uninteresting. And the insight that the
Court manipulates the law of standing to advance judicial policy preferences has become
more fatuous than scandalous.”).
3
See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 2 (commentary by Matt Coles, Deputy Legal Director of
the ACLU, suggesting that liberal Justices’ votes on the standing issue in Perry indicate
“there weren’t five votes to take down Prop. 8”).
4
See, e.g., Geoffrey Stone, Justice Ginsburg, Roe v. Wade and Same-Sex Marriage,
HUFFINGTON POST, THE BLOG (May 12, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-rstone/justice-ginsburg-roe-v-wa_b_3264307.html (suggesting that Justice’s Ginsburg’s
view that Roe v. Wade went “too far, too fast” might foreshadow her view of how to rule
on marriage equality).
5
See, e.g., Mike Sacks et al., Supreme Court Rules On Prop 8, Lets Gay Marriage
Resume In California, HUFFINGTON POST (June 26, 2013) (observing that, as Chief Justice
Roberts read aloud the Court’s decision in Perry, “Some of the same-sex couples who shed
tears during Kennedy’s DOMA opinion continued to hold hands and nod their heads in
agreement with Roberts. One woman, sitting with her partner, put her hand over her mouth
as Roberts declared the defendants lacked legal standing, and therefore Proposition 8
would be tossed out.”).
6
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Is The Rehnquist Court Really That Conservative?: An
Analysis Of The 1991–92 Term, 26 Creighton L. Rev. 987, 996 (1993) (“Conservatives
have sought to constrict access to the federal judiciary both to advance federalism concerns
and also as a way of decreasing protection of constitutional rights. Liberals want to ensure
access to the federal courts to protect individual liberties and civil rights.”); infra text
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Roberts’s majority opinion in Hollingsworth reinforces, and even tightens,
the Court’s already cramped view of standing.7 Moreover, the failure of the
Court’s four liberal Justices and Justice Kennedy to disregard politics and
affirmatively declare Prop 8 unconstitutional leaves same-sex couples in the
vast majority of states unable to exercise the rights that California couples
now enjoy. In these respects, Hollingsworth is not a victory for
constitutional rights.
I. THE LOWER COURT PROCEEDINGS IN PERRY
The same-sex couples who challenged Prop 8 in federal court named
various state officials, including Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and
Attorney General Jerry Brown, as defendants.8 These state officials
answered the complaint, but they either refused to take a position on the law
or agreed that the initiative was unconstitutional.9 All of the named
defendants declined to defend Prop 8.10 Thereafter, the official proponents
of the initiative under the California Election Code (“proponents”) moved
to intervene to defend Prop 8. The district court orally granted the motion at
a hearing, noting that neither the plaintiffs nor any of the named defendants
had objected to it.11 The district court then held a trial, at which only the
proponents presented witnesses and offered legal arguments in defense of
the initiative.12 After the trial, the district court issued a detailed opinion
holding Prop 8 unconstitutional.13
The question of Article III standing appears to have been raised only
accompanying notes 77–85; see also Laura A. Cisneros, Standing Doctrine, Judicial
Technique, And The Gradual Shift From Rights-Based Constitutionalism To ExecutiveCentered Constitutionalism, 59 Case W. Res. 1089, 1100 (2009) (“The Warren Court took
aggressive steps to increase public access to the federal court system, especially where
plaintiffs had charged government actors — be they of the local, state, or federal variety —
with violations of the law. For this reason, the Warren Court did all that it could to keep the
standing bar low.”).*
7
Adam Liptak has suggested that Chief Justice Roberts, while appearing to exercise
judicial restraint, has deliberately moved the Court rightward in a “canny,” calculated
fashion, using carefully planted language in seemingly modest opinions as support for
subsequent bold and “deeply polarizing” decisions. Adam Liptak, Roberts Pulls Supreme
Court to the Right Step by Step, N.Y. Times (June 27, 2013), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/28/us/politics/roberts-plays-a-long-game.html. If Liptak
is right, Hollingsworth may prove to be a decision that, while garnering liberal votes today,
the Chief Justice uses to make a more obviously conservative move in the future.
8
265 P.3d 1002, 1128–29 (Cal. 2011).
9
Id. at 1129.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
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when the state officials chose not to appeal the district court’s decision. On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit first considered whether it had jurisdiction to hear
the appeal,14 asking proponents to address “why this appeal should not be
dismissed for lack of Article III standing.”15 The Ninth Circuit then certified
to the California Supreme Court the question whether,
under California Law, the official proponents of an initiative
measure possess either a particularized interest in the initiative’s
validity or the authority to assert the State’s interest in the
initiative’s validity, which would enable them to defend the
constitutionality of the initiative upon its adoption or appeal a
judgment invalidating the initiative, when the public officials
charged with that duty refuse to do so.16

The California Supreme Court responded that the official proponents were
authorized under California law to represent the interests of the state of
California in defending Prop 8’s constitutionality.17 In a detailed opinion,
the court recounted California’s long history of recognizing official
proponents as proper parties to defend citizen initiatives. The court
explained that granting proponents this authority was crucial to insuring the
integrity and meaningfulness of the initiative process, which it explained
had originated as a progressive response to public dissatisfaction with the
state’s elected officials. The court noted that, under California law,
proponents possessed standing to represent the interest of the people
regardless of whether state officials were also defending the law, but it
stressed the special importance of recognizing proponents’ standing when
state officials declined to do so.
The Ninth Circuit deferred to the California Supreme Court’s decision
in determining that federal standing requirements were met. It stated, “All a
federal court need determine is that the state has suffered a harm sufficient
to confer standing and that the party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the
court is authorized by the state to represent its interest in remedying that
harm.”18 The Ninth Circuit further found, “It is [the states’] prerogative, as
independent sovereigns, to decide for themselves who may assert their
interests and under what circumstances, and to bestow that authority
accordingly.” The court relied in part on Karcher v. May,19 which held that
the Speaker of the New Jersey General Assembly and the President of the
14

Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012).
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, Civ. No. 10-16696, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2010).
16
671 F.3d at 1070.
17
Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1007 (Cal. 2011).
18
Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d at 1072.
19
484 U.S. 72 (1987).
15
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state’s Senate, appearing on behalf of the New Jersey legislature, could
properly represent the State of New Jersey in litigation because “the New
Jersey Legislature had authority under state law to represent the State’s
interests.”20
Having found that it could properly address the merits, the Ninth Circuit
struck down Prop 8, but on different and narrower grounds than those of the
district court. The California Supreme Court had previously interpreted the
state constitution to require legal recognition of same-sex marriages.21
Relying on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Romer v.
Evans,22 the Ninth Circuit found that Prop 8 impermissibly withdrew an
existing right (the right to marry) from one group (same-sex couples) but
not others, based solely on “a majority’s private disapproval of [gays and
lesbians] and their relationships.”23 Because most states have never
recognized the right of same-sex couples to marry, this decision was
essentially limited in its impact to the state of California.
II. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: HOLLINGSWORTH V. PERRY
A. The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review both the Ninth Circuit’s
decision on the merits and its determination of the standing question.24
Because it found that proponents lacked standing to appeal, however, the
Court never reached the merits. The Supreme Court mentioned without
comment the district court’s decision to allow the proponents to intervene to
defend the law.25 Instead, like the Ninth Circuit, the Court focused on
whether the proponents had standing to appeal the district court’s
invalidation of Prop 8. The Court found that, since the district court had not
ordered the proponents “to do or refrain from doing anything,” the
proponents’ interest in defending the constitutionality of a generally
applicable state law did not amount the required “direct stake” in the
outcome of appeal.26 The Court also found that the proponents’ unique role
in the initiative process did not endow them with an individualized interest
in defending Prop 8. Rather, the Court found, this role gave the proponents
an interest only in seeing that the initiative process was properly carried out.
20

Id. at 82 (citing In re Forsythe, 450 A.2d 499, 500 (N.J. 1982)).
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
22
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
23
671 F.3d at 1095.
24
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013).
25
Id. at 2660.
26
Id. at 2662.
21
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Once the voters had approved Prop 8, the proponents’ interest in defending
its enforcement was indistinguishable from “the general interest of every
citizen of California.”27
The Court was likewise unimpressed with proponents’ argument that
state law authorized them to assert California’s interest in defending Prop 8
and that they therefore need not show a personal interest in vindicating the
measure. The Court found that, while states may appoint certain state
officials as “agents” to represent them in federal court, proponents did not
constitute such officials. The Court thus distinguished Karcher v. May,
where the Supreme Court recognized Article III standing because New
Jersey law provided that the Speaker and President of the state legislature
could intervene in their official capacities to defend a state statute.
The Court also relied on dicta in Arizonans for Official English v.
Arizona28 to suggest that initiative sponsors could only have standing to
defend an initiative’s constitutionality if state law expressly appointed them
as “agents” of the state.29 Although the California Supreme Court had
elaborated extensively on the long history of and rationale for allowing
initiative proponents to represent the people’s interest under California state
law, the majority was unsatisfied with that court’s declaration that the
proponents thus possessed “the authority to assert the State’s interest in the
initiative’s validity.”30 Despite this authority, the Court asserted, the
proponents were “plainly not agents of the State — ‘formal’ or otherwise,”
and their interest in the litigation was too generalized to meet the
requirements of standing under Article III.31 Article III requires a “personal,
particularized injury,” which the proponents here lacked.32
B. Justice Kennedy’s Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, and Sotomayor,
dissented. While the majority saw the California Supreme Court’s
opinion—and the Ninth Circuit’s deference to it—as an improper attempt to
give unqualified private parties a “ticket to the federal courthouse,”33 Justice
Kennedy maintained that “[p]roper resolution of the justiciability question
requires . . . a threshold determination of state law.”34 Kennedy viewed the
27

Id. at 2663.
520 U.S. 43 (1997).
29
Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2663 (citing Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 65).
30
Id. at 2660 (quoting Perry, 628 F.3d at 1193; Perry, 265 P.3d at 1007) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
31
Id. at 2666.
32
Id. at 2667.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 2668 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
28

2013]

STANDING OVER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

33

California Supreme Court’s answer to this determination—its defining of
proponents’ powers—as binding on the Court.35
Not only did Justice Kennedy view the California Supreme Court’s
determination as binding, but he agreed substantively with the court’s
conclusion that official proponents were logical parties to represent the
state’s interests in defending an initiative. He noted, “Proponents’ authority
under state law is not a contrivance. It is not a fictional construct.”36 He
found proponents’ commitment to the case “substantial,” their knowledge
of the purpose and operation of the initiative significant, and their stake in
the outcome sufficient “to provide zealous advocacy.”37
Justice Kennedy disagreed with the majority that a formal agency
relationship is necessary to satisfy Article III standing requirements,38 and
he gave reasons why California might want to eschew a formal agency
relationship.39 Moreover, Justice Kennedy emphasized that the initiative
process furthers democratic principles. “The essence of democracy is that
the right to make law rests in the people and flows to the government, not
the other way around.”40 Kennedy maintained that the Court’s standing
ruling frustrated the people’s decision to “exercise[] their own inherent
sovereign right to govern themselves.”41
III. A CRITICAL LOOK AT HOLLINGSWORTH V. PERRY
A. A Further Narrowing of Standing Doctrine
The Supreme Court’s denial of proponents’ standing left several
difficult and important questions perfunctorily addressed or wholly
unexplored. One significant question that the Court failed to consider is
whether there is a difference between the interests of the “People” and the
interests of the “State” when state officials refuse to defend a duly passed
initiative. In California’s process that resulted in Prop 8, the legislature
played no part in enacting the initiative. Therefore, unlike in Karcher v.
May, the public could not count on the legislature to defend the initiative
the public had passed. If proponents’ standing were not recognized, the
35

Id.
Id. at 2670.
37
Id. at 2669.
38
Id. at 2672–74.
39
Id. at 2671 (state may wish to limit its association with proponents to the narrow
context of litigation; avoid bearing the cost of proponents’ legal fees; and avoid the “odd
conflict” of having one formal agent defend the law while others attack its validity in the
same litigation).
40
Id. at 2675.
41
Id.
36
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named executive officials could essentially stymie the public’s will and
deny it any possible federal court remedy simply by refusing to defend the
law. On the other hand, to recognize proponents’ standing in such a case
means that two parties—the state officials on the one hand, and the official
proponents on the other—will simultaneously assert conflicting interests, all
supposedly on behalf of the state. Suzanne Goldberg has argued that this
result is intolerable.42 Moreover, she argues, the problem is not solved by
asserting that the proponents represent the interests of the “People,” as
distinct from the “state,” because the California Supreme Court itself made
clear that to advance the People’s interests is to advance the state’s interests.
The idea that a state could have different, conflicting interests that could
be asserted by different parties is not without precedent in state law,
however. In fact, although the California Supreme Court did refer to the
“state’s” interest and the “People’s” interest interchangeably, it also
expressly recognized that the state’s interests are often multi-dimensional.
Likewise, the United States Supreme Court has not found the idea of
conflicting official positions on behalf of the “state” troubling. In Karcher,
the Supreme Court recognized that, in the context of a statute enacted by a
state legislature, a state could remedy executive branch officials’ refusal to
defend the law by authorizing certain legislative members to do so. At the
same time, the Court has said that it is perfectly proper for executive branch
officials to decline to defend a law. Thus, the Court has contemplated one
branch—a state legislature—arguing for constitutionality while another—
the state’s executive officials—takes the opposite position. This
phenomenon, while arguably odd, recognizes that a “state” consists of
separate branches with sometimes overlapping authority. In the case of
citizen initiatives, the public operates as yet another “branch” of
government whose interests (which may be described as those of the
“People”) may not align with state interests as viewed by the legislative and
executive branches.43
Although Karcher addressed state legislators’—rather than initiative
proponents’—authority to defend a law that the state’s executive branch
refuses to defend, the Court’s refusal to acknowledge its similarities to the
Prop 8 situation seems disingenuous. In both cases, there was clear state law
authorizing alternative parties to defend a law when the state’s executive

42

Suzanne Goldberg, Article III Double-Dipping: Proposition 8’s Sponsors, BLAG,
and the Government’s Interest, 161 U. PA. L. Rev. Online 164, 170 (2013).
43
Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002 (Cal. 2011). Justice Kennedy might go further to say
that the “People’s” interest is not only independent of, but takes precedence over, that of
the governmental branches, whose power derives from the people. See Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 133 S. Ct..at 2671, 2675 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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officials refuse to do so.44 The Court emphasized that in Karcher the
individuals authorized by state law to defend a statute were state officials
(the President and Speaker of the New Jersey legislature), not private
parties. The Court found it “significant” that, when the two individuals who
had originally held those seats lost those positions, the Supreme Court had
held they also lost their authority to defend the statute.45 But New Jersey
law had clearly authorized the President and Speaker, not these particular
individuals, to defend the law. It is unsurprising that, once they no longer
occupied those positions, the individuals were no longer entitled under New
Jersey law to represent the state. No similar loss of official status occurred
to the Prop 8 proponents. The California Supreme Court found that
California initiative proponents do possess the authority to defend an
initiative’s constitutionality should the sued state officials decline to do so.
An initiative need only ever be defended on the merits once the initiative
has become law and the initiative process is complete. Thus, in the
California Supreme Court’s view, proponents in this case had not lost their
status as the initiative’s official proponents or their authority to defend the
law merely because the initiative process had ended.
The majority attempted to circumvent this point by reading Karcher to
forbid any private parties to represent the state’s interest. The Court noted,
legislators “Karcher and Orechio were permitted to proceed only because
they were state officers, acting in an official capacity.”46 The sentence’s
passive voice leaves its precise point unclear, however: permitted by
whom? If the Court is making a point only about what New Jersey
permitted, the statement is unsurprising and would not seem to foreclose the
possibility that another state might recognize a different delegation of
authority, especially with respect to a citizen initiative.
If instead the Court meant that Article III permits only a state’s
delegations of authority to state officials and not to private parties, it does
not explain why that is so. After all, if the initiative proponents in Perry lost
any particularized interest in defending the initiative once it became law,47
the legislators in Karcher likewise could demonstrate no greater interest in
enforcing the law in question once it became law than any other legislator
or citizen of New Jersey.48 Conversely, if state-granted authority to defend
44

In Perry, this authority was not expressly granted by statute or the state constitution,
but the California Supreme Court could not have been more emphatic in affirming
proponents’ power under state law to defend the constitutionality of initiatives. See 265
P.3d at 1015–1026.
45
Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2657.
46
Id. at 2665.
47
Id. at 2659.
48
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Private Parties, Legislators, and the Government’s Mantle:
On Intervention and Article III Standing 1–43 (2012),(Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law &
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the state or people’s interest is sufficient to give a state official the requisite
“ongoing interest” to satisfy Article III,49 it is hard to imagine why the same
authority should not similarly suffice for private parties such as initiative
proponents.
The Court’s answer to this may lie in its emphasis that state officials,
unlike initiative proponents, hold an agency relationship with the state
under traditional agency law.50 The Court seems to suggest that this agency
relationship creates a more specific and sharper interest, perhaps because of
the consequences flowing to an agent who fails to meet his or her legal
responsibilities.51 This explanation is not fully satisfactory, however, given
the discretion vested in state officials to decide whether or not to defend a
law. In Karcher, for example, the state legislators may have been authorized
under state law to defend a statute’s constitutionality, but they certainly
were not required to do so.52 Although the Court is correct that legislators
who fail to do so must contend with the public’s potential reaction through
the electoral process, this does not explain why initiative proponents who
affirmatively choose to defend a law and are clearly strongly interested in
seeing the law upheld somehow have a weaker interest than a state official.
Perhaps, instead, the Court’s point is that proponents’ interest, however
strongly felt, is not sufficiently tied to the state.53 The Court warned that
initiative proponents’ independent status means they are freer than state
officials to make whatever arguments they choose, “without the need to
take cognizance of resource constraints, changes in public opinion, or
potential ramifications for other state priorities.”54 Again, however, it is not
clear why this should be relevant to whether a case or controversy exists
Legal Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 12-325, 2012) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2193601
(discussing
grant
of
intervention in Perry and questioning whether initiative proponents should be granted
intervention of right to defend the constitutionality of initiatives) (hereinafter
Goldberg,Government’s Mantle).
49
The traditional standing inquiry focuses on whether the plaintiff has demonstrated
an “injury in fact.” Defendants need not make this showing, of course, but the Court has
found that they must “have an ongoing interest in the dispute, so that the case features that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of the issues.” Camreta v. Greene,
131 S. Ct. 2020, 2028 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
50
For its agency argument, the Court relied heavily on an amicus brief that presented
this agency argument. Brief for Walter Dellinger, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144), 2013 WL
768643; see also Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2657–58 (citing Dellinger brief).
51
See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2666 (“petitioners answer to no one”).
52
See Karcher, 484 U.S. at 80; see also Perry, 265 P.3d at 528–29 (discussing state
officials’ discretion in determining whether to defend a law).
53
See Goldberg, Government’s Mantle, supra note 47, at 35.
54
Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2667.
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under Article III. If the state is satisfied that the party in question will
adequately represent its interests, what constitutional purpose is served in
second-guessing that conclusion?
Whatever the reasons for it, the Court in Hollingsworth seems to hold
that a private party who does not possess formal agency status can never
adequately represent a state’s interest, regardless of whether the state
believes it can do so. This importation of agency concepts into standing
doctrine is a significant and new elaboration of what Article III requires
when a state law is challenged as unconstitutional, and it serves to further
narrow the ability of citizens to meet Article III standing.55
As concerned as the Supreme Court in Hollingsworth was with
proponents’ standing to appeal, it never addressed their standing to defend
the law in district court in the first place. The Supreme Court appeared to
assume that an Article III case or controversy existed there,56 but it did not
explain why. The district court had granted intervention of right,57 but the
question of federal standing is a separate inquiry that must be satisfied
before a federal court can exercise jurisdiction.58 If the proponents lacked a
sufficiently particularized interest to defend the initiative on appeal, it is not
evident why they possessed such an interest at the district court level. And
while intervenors may not separately have to meet standing requirements if
another defendant already does,59 here the proponents were effectively the
sole parties defending the law not only on appeal but also in the district
court.
The Court may have concluded that a case or controversy existed,
regardless of the proponents’ standing, because the state officials continued
to enforce Prop 8 throughout the litigation, even though they refused to
defend the law.60 INS v. Chadha provides support for the idea that an Article
III case or controversy exists so long as the Executive continues to enforce a
challenged law, even if it agrees that the law is unconstitutional.61 However,
in Chadha the Court did concede that “prudential, as opposed to Article III,
concerns” rendered important the lower court’s identification of an
55

Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing after Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and
Article III, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 163 (1992) (noting Court’s trend, led by Justice Scalia, toward
tightening Article III standing requirements); see alsoHollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2672–73
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (criticizing Court’s reliance on formal agency principles).
56
See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2660.
57
See id. at 2670; see also Goldberg, Government’s Mantle, supra note 47,at 14–15
(discussing grant of intervention in Perry and questioning whether initiative proponents
should be granted intervention of right to defend the constitutionality of initiatives).
58
Goldberg, Government’s Mantle, supra note 47, at 18–19.
59
Id.
60
Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2660.
61
462 U.S. 919, 938–40 (1983).
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alternative party—in this case both houses of Congress—to defend the
statute’s validity.62 Whether characterized as a prudential or constitutional
concern, the Executive branch’s agreement that a law is unconstitutional
and its refusal to present any legal defense whatsoever63 should raise serious
concerns to a Court that has emphasized so strongly the importance of
“adverseness” in constitutional litigation.64 “[F]ederal courts will not
entertain friendly suits, or those which are feigned or collusive in nature.”65
If continued enforcement is alone sufficient to establish standing, state
officials who object to a state law on policy grounds could essentially
conspire with plaintiffs to seek its invalidation by enforcing the law, while
otherwise agreeing with plaintiffs that it was unconstitutional and refusing
to present a defense. This seems to be precisely the kind of “friendly suit”
that the case or controversy requirement was meant to prohibit.
The state officials’ refusal to defend the law at the trial court level is
thus a sufficiently significant issue that the Court should have addressed it
in Hollingsworth.66 This is particularly so since the Court viewed the
proponents, unlike Congress in Chadha, as lacking the requisite authority to
defend the initiative. The Court should have at least addressed the difficult
question of how a state could simultaneously side with plaintiffs on the
substantive legal questions and be sufficiently adverse. Recognizing the
proponents’ authority to represent the people’s interest in defending a duly
enacted initiative would have been one way out of this thicket.67
62

Id. at 940.
See Perry, 265 P.3d at 1130 (noting that “Proponents were the only party in the
district court to present witnesses and legal argument in defense of the challenged initiative
measure”). Cf. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 930-–31, 931 n.6 (stating that INS did not lose
“aggrieved party” status required for appeal merely because the Executive might agree that
the statute in question was unconstitutional, but noting separate requirement that an appeal
“present a justiciable case or controversy under Art. III,” a requirement met in this case
“because of the presence of the two Houses of Congress as adverse parties”).
64
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
65
Flast, 392 U.S. at 100 (1968) (citations omitted).
66
Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Op–Ed, Prop. 8 Deserved a Defense, L.A. Times (June 28,
2013), available at http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-chemerinskyproposition-8-initiatives-20130628,0,3109622.story (agreeing with Court’s standing
analysis but expressing concern about allowing “a few officials to nullify an initiative by
not defending it” and suggesting reforms).
67
The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013),
may provide another clue as to the Court’s lack of concern about adverseness. In Windsor,
the Court addressed the merits of a challenge to a provision of the federal Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA) despite the fact that the Obama Administration agreed that the
statute was unconstitutional. The Court found that “a controversy sufficient for Article III
jurisdiction” existed because the Administration nevertheless refused to grant plaintiff Edie
Windsor the monetary relief she sought. See id. at 2686. Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion
in that case remarked on the majority’s striking disregard of the once paramount
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Viewed in the specific context of Prop 8, Chief Justice Roberts’s
decision in Hollingsworth seems somewhat mystifying. The Chief Justice,
joined by Justice Scalia, appears to go out of his way to prevent a duly
enacted citizen initiative from being defended in federal court. The Court’s
standing decisions since the 1970s have justified demanding criteria for
standing as necessary to protect the political branches from encroachment
by the judiciary.68 The Court repeated this admonition in Hollingsworth.69
Yet here, the Court’s narrow interpretation of standing doctrine facilitated
the judicial invalidation of a law adopted through the political process. The
Court’s continued insistence on separation of powers rationales to support
its cramped standing doctrine thus seems out of place in Hollingsworth.70 It
is important to look beyond the facts of the case, however, and to recognize
that the decision is consistent with the Court’s general trend of limiting
citizens’ access to the federal courts in order to protect the power of the
political branches, especially the Executive branch.71 This trend has largely
been harmful to rights claimants. Beginning with the Burger Court, and
continuing through the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, standing has come to
serve a rigid gatekeeping function that often undermines citizens’ ability to
challenge oppressive governmental action and vindicate constitutional
rights.
Historically, standing demanded only that the plaintiff possess a legal
cause of action; it was neither necessary nor sufficient to identify a
particularized injury.72 Under Warren Court precedents, Article III’s “case
requirement of adverseness. Id. at 2701 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Windsor, the Bipartisan
Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) did mount a defense of DOMA, but the Court oddly failed
to address the question of BLAG’s standing. See id. at 2688 (“the Court need not decide
whether BLAG would have standing to challenge the District Court’s ruling and its
affirmance in the Court of Appeals on BLAG’s own authority”).
68
See infra text accompanying notes 81–85.
69
Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2661 (stating that “that the doctrine of standing “serves
to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political
branches” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
70
See id. at 2674 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing “irony” that, “rather than
recognize that justiciability exists to allow disputes of public policy to be resolved by the
political process rather than the courts, here the Court refuses to allow a State’s authorized
representatives to defend the outcome of a democratic election”).*
71
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Windsor reflects the generally conservative
impulse to protect and enhance the power of the Executive. Despite what one imagines
would be his strong disagreement with the Obama administration’s position on DOMA,
Justice Scalia reaffirmed his belief in the President’s power to determine that a statute is
unconstitutional, without judicial interference. 133 S. Ct. at 2702 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“If what we say is true some Presidential determinations that statutes are unconstitutional
will not be subject to our review. That is as it should be.”).*
72
Sunstein, supra note 54, at 177–78, 182 (arguing that early English and American
practices support simple test for standing, namely that “people have standing if the law has
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or controversy” requirement was understood as requiring that the plaintiff
have suffered an injury,73 but the needed injury was still understood to be a
“legal wrong” rather than calling for a factual inquiry independent of law.74
Moreover, the primary focus of this inquiry into the plaintiff’s “injury” was
to ensure adverseness. As the Warren Court explained in Baker v. Carr,
“the gist of the question of standing” is whether the claimant has “alleged
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.”75 The Warren Court specifically rejected the idea that standing
implicates the separation of powers.76
The Burger Court ushered in two significant shifts in standing doctrine
that served to limit constitutional claimants’ access to the federal courts: the
first was a change in what constituted a sufficient “injury” for standing
purposes; the second was to ground standing emphatically in separation of
powers principles. The Burger Court inaugurated the first major shift in
standing doctrine by presenting the existence of an “injury” as a question of
fact, not law.77 This modification, Cass Sunstein argues, was not just new
but disingenuous. “[The Burger] Court, and its successors (the Lujan [v.
Defenders of Wildlife] Court among them), seem to assume that whether
there is an ‘injury’ can be answered . . . as if the [question] depended on
some brute fact, not on evaluation, and not on law. But this is false.”78
Describing the inquiry as factual disguises the normative judgments that
inevitably underlie the Court’s conclusions as to what counts as an
granted them a right to bring suit”). The Warren Court later expanded standing to
encompass not only the objects of regulation but also its beneficiaries. Id. at 183 (“The
shift in this . . . period began when courts interpreted the ‘legal wrong’ test to allow many
people affected by government decisions — including beneficiaries of regulatory programs
— to bring suit to challenge government action.”).
73
The Court did not, however, use the term “injury in fact,” a phrase first employed in
1970. Id. at 169.
74
David M. Driesen, Standing For Nothing: The Paradox Of Demanding Concrete
Context For Formalist Adjudication, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 808, 816 (2004); Sunstein, supra
note 54, at 184.
75
369 U.S. at 204; see also Flast, 392 U.S. at 99 (quoting Baker, 369 at 204).
76
See Flast, 392 U.S. at 99–101 (“The question whether a particular person is a proper
party to maintain the action does not, by its own force, raise separation of powers problems
related to improper judicial interference in areas committed to other branches of the
Federal Government. . . . In terms of Article III limitations on federal court jurisdiction, the
question of standing is related only to whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be
presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial
resolution.”*).
77
Sunstein, supra note 54, at 185–86.
78
Id. at 188–89.
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“injury.”79 The Burger Court further narrowed the “injury in fact”
requirement to demand that this injury be (1) caused by the defendant and
(2) likely to be redressed by a court decision in the claimant’s favor.80
Beyond the requirement of injury in fact, the Court—in an about-face
from Flast—began to speak of standing as motivated by separation of
powers concerns.81 In particular, the Court sought to use standing to bar
lawsuits it saw as challenging Executive branch power.82 In Allen v. Wright,
for example, the Court declared that the causation and redressibility
requirements were necessary to foreclose an expansion of challenges to
governmental action that would ultimately render the federal courts
“virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive
action.”83 In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Court emphasized that
“[v]indicating the public interest (including the public interest in
government observance of the Constitution and laws) is the function of
Congress and the Chief Executive” rather than the Court.84 Moreover, the
Court went on, such a public interest could not be converted into an
individual right through a legislative grant of standing, because such a
legislative grant would yield the same, dangerous expansion of judicial
power.85
The Burger Court, followed by the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, so
successfully solidified the link between standing and Article III that it is
79

As Sunstein argues, an African American claimant challenging a tax deduction to a
segregated school, or an environmentalist objecting to the destruction of a pristine area,
believes herself to have suffered a real injury. To deny this is to “import our own, valueladen ideas about what things ought to count. We are not simply describing some fact about
the world.”*Id. at 189; see also Cisneros, supra note 5, at 1113 (describing significant
change in how Burger Court described the required injury).
80
See, e.g. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976); Driesen, supra note 74, at 817.
81
Allen, 468 U.S. at 752 (1984) (“The law of Art. III standing is built on a single basic
idea – the idea of separation of powers.”*). But see id. at 766 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“Once again, the Court uses standing to slam the courthouse door against plaintiffs who
are entitled to full consideration of their claims on the merits. And once again, the Court
does so by waxing eloquent on considerations that provide little justification for the
decision at hand. This time, however, the Court focuses on the idea of separation of
powers, as if the mere incantation of that phrase provides an obvious solution to the
difficult questions presented by these cases.” (citations and quotation marks omitted)).
82
Cisneros, supra note 5, at 1124; see also Sunstein, supra note 54, at 213 (“Lujan
seems to be built in key part on the idea that citizen standing — like other legislative
interference with the President’s power to execute the law is unacceptable under Article II.
Indeed, many of the recent standing cases might be thought to be Article II cases
masquerading under the guise of Article III.”).
83
Allen, 468 U.S. at 760.
84
504 U.S. 555, 576–77 (1992).
85
Id. at 577.
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easy to forget how recent—and far from self-evident—this linkage is.86
“Article III contains no explicit constitutional requirement of ‘standing’ or
‘personal stake.’ Nor does it ever refer to ‘injury in fact.’”87 Just as the now
familiar three-part test for standing88 is not self-evidently compelled by the
Constitution, neither is the idea that standing exists to enforce separation of
powers principles.89 Injury in fact and separation of powers are concepts
that are not clearly related to each other, let alone to standing.90 The Burger,
Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts have used standing doctrine to roll back the
rights-protective decisions of the Warren Court and empower the Executive
Branch under the seemingly neutral guise of procedural decisionmaking.91
Notwithstanding its odd posture, Hollingsworth not only applies, but builds
upon, this dubious legacy.
B. A Lost Opportunity to Establish Equality
Because a majority of the Supreme Court agreed that the amendment’s
proponent’s lacked standing to appeal, the Court did not address the merits
of the case. However, it is interesting to speculate why the Justices lined up
as they did on the standing question, and what their position on the merits of
the case may have been.
Two conservative Justices would have proceeded to the merits. It is safe
to assume that both Justices Thomas and Alito would have voted to uphold
Prop 8. It is likewise not unreasonable to imagine that Justice Sotomayor
was prepared to find Prop 8 unconstitutional. Many court watchers,
however, had speculated that Justice Kennedy, who authored the strong
dissent rejecting the Court’s standing dodge, would be the one pressing for
a procedural way out.92 Justice Kennedy’s confused opinion for the majority
86

See Driesen, supra note 74, at 823 (“this separation of powers rationale aims to
explain why the Court reads Article III to require standing”); see alsoCisneros, supra note
5, at 1110–11 (describing shift under which Court began to “tether its in-house rules of
standing to Article III, elevating the inquiry from a prudential analysis to a constitutional
one”*).
87
Sunstein, supra note 54, at 168.
88
This test requires that a plaintiff show injury-in-fact, causation, and redressibility.
Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2661.
89
See Cisneros, supra note 5, at 1117; see also Sunstein, supra note 54, at 216–17.
90
See Driesen, supra note 74, at 825 (“The question of improper (judicial) interference
(with the legislative and executive branches) properly focuses upon the merits, the political
question doctrine, and questions of equitable discretion, not upon injuries to parties.”*).
91
Cisneros, supra note 5, at 1124; Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 996–97 (1993);
Allen, 468 U.S. at 766 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92
See, e.g., James Oliphant, Supreme Court Rulings on Gay Marriage: A Liberal
Result Wrapped in Conservative Values, The National Journal (June 27, 2013) available at
http://www.nationaljournal.com/domesticpolicy/supreme-court-rulings-on-gay-marriage-a-
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in United States v. Windsor finding DOMA’s section 3 unconstitutional
does not yield definitive insight into how Justice Kennedy would have
decided the merits of Hollingsworth. On the one hand, the opinion
reverberates with indignation at the injustices bans on same-sex marriages
impose93 and suggests that these injustices are never permissible under the
federal Constitution.94 Justice Scalia, for one, saw the majority opinion as a
thinly disguised step toward ultimate recognition of same-sex couples’
constitutional right to marry.95 On the other hand, Justice Kennedy took
pains to emphasize the states’ prerogative to define marriage and to remind
the public that its opinion and holding are confined to those same-sex
marriages that—so far—only a handful of states recognize as lawful.96 This
suggests a respect for federalism and a desire to proceed in an incremental
fashion, calling into question whether Justice Kennedy would have found it
prudent to set a precedent that would invalidate the bans that the vast
majority of states still enforce.
Justice Ginsburg’s likely intentions are less opaque. It is not surprising
that she would want to avoid the merits in Hollingsworth. Justice Ginsburg
has not made a secret of her reservations about Roe v. Wade’s establishment
of a constitutional right to abortion. Although she supports a woman’s right
to choose to end her pregnancy, Justice Ginsburg believed that Roe
circumvented a tide of political reform in the states, prompting counterproductive political “backlash.”97 It is questionable whether abortion reform
liberal-result-wrapped-in-conservative-values-20130626(“Oddly
enough,
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See, e.g., Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (stating that the Court must decide whether
section 3 of DOMA and its “resulting injury and indignity is a deprivation of an essential
part of the liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment”); id. at 2694 (DOMA’s
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to the Federal Government.”).
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would have continued in the absence of Roe, and whether such reform
would have quieted opposition to abortion rights.98 But Justice Ginsburg’s
view of Roeas politically premature strongly suggests that she would regard
a decision establishing the right of same-sex couples to marry as similarly
“too much, too soon.”99 Justices Breyer and Kagan may well have shared
Justice Ginsburg’s reluctance to wade into the roiling public debate over
marriage equality.
Justice Ginsburg is often described as the leader of the current Court’s
liberal wing.100 Her hesitation to reach the merits of Prop 8’s
constitutionality is therefore a sign of how far right the Court has moved.
As a final exercise in speculation, we can imagine how a liberal Justice in
the mold of the Warren Court would have decided Hollingsworth. First, this
archetypal liberal Justice would likely have recognized the proponents’
standing, and not just as a vehicle for reaching the merits. As discussed
above, it has typically been a conservative position to foreclose access to
courts through procedural vehicles such as standing. Indeed, besides
California, two state supreme courts (Alaska and Montana) known for
issuing liberal opinions101 have also ruled fairly recently that official
initiative proponents possess the authority to defend the constitutionality of
citizen initiatives.102
Assuming our liberal Justice persuaded four others to join her in
proceeding to the merits, she would next have urged her colleagues to
declare, without shame or reluctance, that Prop 8 violates same-sex couples’
rights to equal protection and substantive due process.103 Our Justice would
have recognized that, when fundamental constitutional rights are at stake, it
is the United State Supreme Court’s responsibility to step in to protect these
rights from majoritarian oppression. It is not surprising that the Court
prefers to issue opinions on controversial issues only after it has a solid
98
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United for Life (2007), available at http://www.aul.org/docs/statecourts/AK.pdf; Rob
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Conservative, No!,” Montana Policy Institute (Mar. 8, 2013), available at
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103
See Sportsmen for I-143 v. Fifteenth Jud. Ct., 40 P.3d 400 (Mont. 2002); Alaskans
for a Common Language Inc. v. Kritz, 3 P.3d 906 (Alaska 2000).

2013]

STANDING OVER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

45

sense of how the political winds are blowing. But such hesitation amounts
to a shirking of one of the Court’s most important responsibilities. Roe v.
Wade, while not as controversial in 1973 as often portrayed,104 did preempt
political resolutions of the abortion issue. Because of this, women in states
like North Dakota, Alabama, and Mississippi have benefited from forty
years of access to safe, legal abortions, access that these states would never
have provided on their own initiative. Today, same-sex couples in most
states must hope for political reform or await the Court’s next move. If the
Court fails to act, couples in the most conservative states could be waiting
for a long time.
CONCLUSION
In the giddy aftermath of the DOMA and Prop 8 decisions, it was
tempting for supporters of marriage equality to breathe a sigh of relief at the
Court’s opinion in Perry v. Hollingsworth. But the decision ought at least to
give us pause. Hollingsworth produced a thorough “mish-mash” of
conservatives and liberals on the standing question.105 It may be that each
Justice would have reached his or her decision regardless of the merits
looming on the other side of this procedural hurdle. Certainly Justice Scalia
has been consistent—and remained so in both Perry and Windsor—in
preferring to keep access to federal courts tightly controlled.106 But it is
likely that at least some Justices, as well commentators, were influenced by
their eagerness for or fear of having the Court reach the merits.
It is understandable that Justices, litigators, and scholars who believe in
the right to marriage equality were loathe to see the Court take up this issue
too soon and thereby risk an adverse decision that could set back
recognition of a federal right.107 At the same time, it is important to
recognize the Court’s decision on the procedural question for what it is. The
Court sacrificed a liberal commitment to broader citizen access to the
federal court for pragmatic purposes, reinforcing and lending legitimacy to
the conservative trend of tightening Article III standing requirements. The
precedent Perry establishes could negatively affect citizens’ ability to
104
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defend progressive laws that establish or enhance, rather than constrict,
rights.108 It also reinforces existing limitations upon citizens’ ability to
challenge laws that violate important rights or that harm the environment or
other public resources.109 In the meantime, we must not forget that
innumerable gay couples across the country who desire marriage are still
waiting for formal, and equal, state recognition of their relationships.
***
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